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Community-based  health  insurance 
schemes (Mutuelles) in Rwanda are one 
of the largest experiments in community 
based  risk-sharing  mechanisms  in  Sub-
Saharan  Africa  for  health  related 
problems.  This  study  examines  the 
impact  of  the  program  on  demand  for 
modern health care, mitigation of out-of-
pocket  catastrophic  health  expenditure 
and  social  inclusiveness  based  on  a 
nationally  representative  household 
survey  using  traditional  regression 
approach  and  matching  estimator 
popular  in  the  evaluation  literature.     
Our findings suggest that Mutuelles have 
been successful in increasing utilization 
of  modern  health  care  services  and 
reducing  catastrophic  health  related 
expenditure.  According  to  our  preferred 
method, higher utilization of health care 
services  was  found  among  the  insured 
non-poor than insured poor households, 
with  comparable  effect  in  reducing 
health-related expenditure shocks.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
According to WHO (2005) 100 million people every year are driven into poverty due to 
catastrophic health expenditure. It is imaginable that most reside in resource poor settings 
such as Sub Saharan Africa (SSA) with very weak modern health care systems and in 
most cases without any functioning health insurance schemes (e.g WHO, 2003; Carrin et 
al, 2005) . The result is high disease burden that has  a risk of propagating a sickly, 
unproductive  labor  force.  In  Sub-Saharan  Africa,  formal  and  well  functioning  health 
insurance  schemes  generally  exist  for  the  very  few  who  are  employed  in  the  formal 
sector. For the majority, health care is accessed through out-of-pocket expenditure, which 
in  many  instances  may  lead  to  suboptimal  use  of  health  care  services.  As  a  result, 
expenditure on heath related needs in some countries could be substantially high (see 
Figure 1 & Figure 2) with visible divergence across the income divide. Households in 
poorer  countries  generally  tend  to  spend  as  much  as  those  living  in  relatively  richer 
countries, but evidently with worse health outcomes.  One of the reasons could be lack of 
functioning health insurance scheme to protect households from illness related income or 
expenditure shocks.  Formal health insurance schemes for the self-employed and rural 
farmers  are  difficult  to  institute  for  a  number  of  reasons.  Community  Based  Health 
Insurance Schemes (CBHISs) are promising alternatives for a cost sharing health care 
system which hopefully also leads to better utilization of health care services, reduce 
illness related income shocks and eventually lead to a sustainable and fully functioning 
universal health care system.   
 
Traditional solidarity organizations exist in a rudimentary form to deal with health related 
shocks in some parts of Africa and have provided the basis for the movement towards 
CBHISs that emerged in response to failure by the state and market to provide such 
services. Ghana, Senegal and Rwanda are among the leading countries that experimented   6 
on the idea of CBHISs as  a national health program  in  Africa (see Juting, 2003  for 
review)   
 
CBHISs in Rwanda are interesting case study for a number of reasons. The first and most 
important is that the country has scaled up coverage of CBHISs from just around 35% in 
2006 to almost 85% in 2008, an exponential growth in a space of two years in the middle 
of uncertainty on its potential impact on health service utilization and protection from 
unforeseen  health  related  income  or  consumption  shocks.  Such  rapid  growth  and 
coverage is unprecedented in the history of CBHISs (Mladovsky and Mossialos, 2007). 
Secondly, CBHISs in Rwanda have been accorded central place by policy makers so that 
they are integral parts of the country’s health program, with a strong administrative and 
political support for their expansion and functioning. Third, the experiment has attracted 
so much interest that other countries are considering the Rwandan model as an alternative 
vehicle for health sector financing and delivery of basic health services.   
 
Some of the strong critiques of the program argue that CBHISs have the potential to 
further alienate the extreme poor from utilizing health services for at least two main 
reasons. First, the flat premium rate (about $2 USD per year per person)
i is considered to 
be too high for the very poor so that given a choice they would rather defer health care 
expenditure until it is vitally needed. Secondly, even if extreme poor pe ople become 
members of CBHISs, they may not fully utilize its provisions since all is not free. There 
are other layers of expenses to be born such as transport, prescription drugs, and others 
including the opportunity cost of time, especially for the casua l laborers. Thus, in short 
the CBHISs could be inefficient and iniquitous for the health service that is heavily 
subsided by funds coming from the treasury as well as international aid. This study 
attempts to contribute to this debate by providing some evi dence on the relationship 
between membership to CBHISs and key indicators that measure intended outcomes. 
Thus, the research questions addressed in this paper are: have the CBHISs in Rwanda 
assisted households to change their behavior towards modern health care utilization?  Has 
                                                 
i This rate refers to 2008   7 
it been successful in averting catastrophic health related expenditure? Most of all, how do 
the poor fare in both instances? 
 
Ideally such issues could have been addressed with little or no bias if the data were 
generated  from  a  fully  randomized  experiment.  In  our  case  we  have  access  to  data 
generated from a field survey so that there is no guarantee that membership to CBHISs is 
entirely random. There are potential selection biases generated from at least the following 
sources.  Households  with  pre-existing  condition  may  self-select  into  the  insurance 
program raising the classic problem of moral hazard. Or, relatively richer households 
may find it cheaper to subscribe to the insurance scheme more than the poor, though their 
behavior  towards  health  care  utilization  or  income  protection  could  not  be  attributed 
solely to the insurance scheme. This is plausible given the flat insurance premium rate 
that is inherently discriminatory against the poor. There are also other unobserved factors 
such as tenacity of local administrations to get compliance for accelerated subscription, 
etc. All of these factors could lead to biases on any estimator that attempts to establish 
causality running from membership to CBHISs to outcomes.  
 
This paper uses both the traditional regression approach as well as the matching estimator 
popular in the evaluation literature to estimate the effect of membership to CBHISs on 
household demand for health care services and income protection bearing in mind the 
endogenity issue raised in the preceding paragraph. In the regression approach, since both 
dependent  and  independent  variables  are  discrete,  estimation  routine  tends  to  be 
complicated  (Heckman,  1978).  Typically,  one  would  require  a  good  instrument  that 
impacts health and income only through membership to CBHISs. As in most empirical 
works, this is a formidable challenge. We identified two potential instruments from the 
data and used them to test for  weak exogenity as in Smith and Blundell (1986) where 
residuals from the first stage regressions including the instruments and other covariates 
would have no explanatory power on  outcome variables. Since weak exogenity could not 
be rejected, we resorted to simple probit models to obtain coefficients that impacted on   8 
outcome variables
ii.  The matching estimator also has a potential to control for selection 
biases arising only from observed covariates. Our result is indicative of significant impact 
on  health  care  utilization  and  household  protection  from  negat ive  health  related 
consumption  shocks  based  on  two  methods.  The  matching  estimator  identified  the 
direction of impact between “treated” and “control” groups under a number of scenarios 
which in general favor the non-poor subscribers over the poor ones. The rest of the paper 
is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a sketch of the analytical framework, Section 
3  describes  the  data  and  definition  of  variables,  Section  4  discusses  the  results  and 
Section 5 concludes the paper.  
 
2.  Estimation methods  
 
2.1. Analytical framework 
 
Do community-based health insurance increase schemes increase demand for modern 
health care system in a resource poor setting? Can they protect households from large 
unforeseen  expenditure  shocks  with  a  potential  to  have  permanent  damage  on 
livelihoods? Are the poor excluded from utilization of modern health care despite being 
insured?  To capture the role of Mutuelles (CBHISs) in facilitating better utilization of 
health  care  services,  mitigation  of  catastrophic  health  related  expenditure,  and  social 
inclusion,  we  employed  the  traditional  regression  approach  as  well  as  the  matching 
estimator popular in the evaluation literature.  
 
The  econometric  model  commonly  used  to  establish  causal  relationship  between 
membership in the CBHISs and outcomes such as demand for health services, income 
protection and others when at least one of the regressors, in this case, membership into 
CBI is suspected to be endogenous (Smith and Blundell, 1986) is given by the following 
relations.  
 
] 0 [ 1 1 1 1 1 2 1        i i i i u x y y                (1.1) 
                                                 
ii Bi-variate probit specification also returned statistically insignificant correlation between the structural 
equation and the reduced auxiliary equation.    9 










































Where  ) , ( 2 1 i i i x x x     is a vector of observations on K (=K1+ K2), and y1i and y2i are 
vectors  of  dependent  variable  and  endogenous  regressor  (in  our  case  dummy  if  a 
household is a member of CBHISs), respectively. The usual identification assumptions 
are  made.  Equations  (1.1)  and  (1.2)  belong  to  a  class  of  systems  equations  where 
estimation of the underlying parameters can be done jointly using bivariate probit model 
under  the  normality  assumption  for  the  error  terms.  There  are  also  other  approaches 
suggested to estimate (1.1) and (1.2), starting from Heckman’s (1978) two-step procedure 
to the recursive full maximum likelihood estimation as discussed in Madalla (1983). To 
utilize the above set up, two instruments have been identified from the data that are 
believed  to  be  correlated  with  the  regressor  but  uncorrelated  with  the  error  term  of 
equation (1.1). One of the instruments is constructed from information provided by each 
household at cluster level so that the bias introduced by individual choice is somehow 
diluted
iii. The second instrument is a dummy whether or not a household reported to have 
a title deed for land owned. This is potentially important indicator of district level 
administrative efficiency that could also impact participation in CBHISs and thus health 
service utilization. We used these instruments along with other covariates to test whether 
the error terms in equations (1.1) and (1.2) are not correlated. If the test is rejected, then, 
joint estimation of equation (1.1) and (1.2) have to be made or other instrumental variable 
estimation methods have to be applied.  
 
The matching estimator popularized by Rosenbaum and Robin (1983) is frequently 
applied in program  evaluation studies where the data is organized along “treated” vs 









C where Ei is enrollment at cluster level, Di is dummy if household is a member, and Ni is 
total number of households in the cluster.    10 
“control”  dichotomy  conditional  on  observed  covariates.  Such  a  dichotomy  allows 
estimation  of  three  statistics  relevant  for  evaluation.  The  Average  Treatment  Effect 
(ATE), compares outcomes between “treated” vs “control” group by taking randomly 
selected individuals from both samples so that impact of a program is evaluated directly. 
The Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT) evaluates program impact among 
randomly selected individuals within the group exposed to the treatment. The Average 
Treatment  Effect  on  the  Control  (ATC)  measures  the  impact  of  a  program  among 
randomly selected individuals within the control group. We report all three estimates for 
the effect of CBHISs on our outcome variables.  
 
Formal  statement  of  the  matching  estimator  may  be  outlined  as  follows.  Evidently, 
impact of program evaluation proceeds with at least the following information:  i D , a 
dummy if  the individual is treated or not ,  i Y  realized outcome due to exposure to the 
treatment and  i X  represents a set of exogenous covariates used as control variables. The 




















i i i D if Y
D if Y
D Y Y            (2) 
 
Matching estimators defined (2) are identified under two very important assumptions (see 
for exposition Imbens, 2004): The assumption of uncofoundness or sometimes known as 
ignorable treatment assignment (Moreno-Serra, 2007) states that treatment assignment of 
a given individual is independent of potential health outcomes with and without treatment 
if observable covariates are held constant. Essentially this implies that theoretically the 
researcher  has  full  information  on  the  subjects  under  study  so  that  there  are  no 
unobserved  factors  simultaneously  correlated  with  the  outcome  of  interest  and  the 
decision to participate in the treatment. The second most important assumption is that 
there  is  a  positive  probability  of  participation  in  the  program  at  all  values  of  the 
covariates  X,  known  as  the  assumption  of  overlap.  This  implies  that  there  are  other 
factors than those in X that influence participation in the program so that the covariates   11 
are not linear predictors of participation in the program. Thus, barring omitted variable 
bias, matching estimators assume that any difference in health outcome between treated 
and untreated individuals is mainly due to the effect of the treatment.  
 
Matching  in  the  literature  has  been  commonly  implemented  through  a  propensity 
matching score often based on probit or logit estimation of outcome variables and use the 
probability  estimates  as basis for matching. Recently  Abadi  and  Imbens  (2006) have 
shown that large sample properties of propensity matching scores have not been available 
until recently and proposed instead a simple matching method based on the notion of 
nearest  neighbor  matching  or  minimum  distance  across  the  covariates  for  each 
observation unit which does not assume any functional form (Abadie and Imbens, 2009).  
 
The  conceptual  parallel  between  the  traditional  regression  approach  and  matching 
estimators is discussed in Angirist (2001), where the most important factor is played by 
the context in which the identification assumption in the causality relationship is laid out. 
Theoretical relations provide insights into what constitutes endogenous and the necessary 
assumptions required to establish identification. In our case, membership to CBHISs is 
driven by household specific factors such as income, schooling, and occupation, age, etc 
(see Section 3 & 4 below) only to  a limited extent. There are significant  exogenous 
factors such as pressures by local administrators who operated against tight deadlines to 
increase membership into the CBHISs over a period of time. Thus, local conditions also 
play  an  important  role,  sometimes  in  a  rather  random  way.  Thus,  if  the  unobserved 
factors , such as these ones, could influence membership in CBHISs but not realized 
health outcomes, still both regression models and matching estimators return valid result, 
with minimum bias. The regression approach lends itself to the close examination of 
endogenity  by  undertaking  tests  using  potential  instruments.  The  result  indicates  that 
residuals from regressions on a set of covariates and instruments have not been found to 
have  any  explanatory  power  suggesting  that  membership  into  CBHISs  is  weakly 
exogenous (Blundell and Smith, 1986). A fully specified simultaneous bivariate probit 
model also returned an insignificant contemporaneous correlation of error terms across 
equations.  Along  these  lines,  simple  probit  could  be  used  to  estimate  the  effect  of   12 
membership  in  CBHISs  on  realized  health  related  outcomes.  The  same  applies  to 
matching estimators with the option of not assuming any functional form that may even 
be  preferred.  In  this  regard,  our  assumption  that  observed  covariates  are  weakly 
exogenous  or  unobserved  effects  does  not  affect  both  dependent  and  independent 
variable, though strong, seems valid in this context.   
 
3. Data and variables definition 
 
The data used in this study was collected in 2005/06 covering around 6,900 households 
with about 35,000 individual histories. The data is a typical living standard survey where 
information  on household demographics,  educational  attainment,  health, consumption, 
income sources, migration, agriculture, labor market condition, household assets, living 
conditions  and  other  variables  were  collected.  Using  this  data  has  the  advantage  of 
generalizability  but  could  suffer  from  the  presence  of  confounding  factors  on  key 
variables of interest. 
 
For this study, we have two dependent variables that we believe could be influenced by 
household decision to join the CBHISs. The first is utilization of modern health care. This 
variable is important in the Rwandan setting because in the absence of any insurance, 
households would have to rely on out-of-pocket expenditure to meet health related needs. 
This is the main drive behind the government’s decision to use CBHISs as choice of 
instrument  for  the  country’s  health  program.  The  other  obvious  attendant  benefit  of 
having  health  insurance  is  whether  or  not  the  household  is  protected  from  large, 
unforeseen health related expenses. Thus, if the insurance scheme is fully functional and 
benefits are realized by members, then, one would expect improvements in utilization of 
health care facilities and also protection from illness related consumption shocks.  We 
defined  health  facility  utilization  as  a  dummy  whether  or  not  a  household  sought 
treatment following illness episodes. Certainly this could be driven by many factors such 
as income, gravity of illness and other factors as availability of health centers in nearby 
areas. To capture income shocks, we defined a dummy variable where a household’s 
current  health  expenditure  is  “catastrophic”.  There  are  no  clear  cut-off  points  in  the 
literature on what level of health expenditure as a share of per capita is considered as   13 
catastrophic. Some use around 20%, others take larger values. In our case, given the low 
income  level  of  the  country,  we  have  defined  catastrophic  expenditure  as  the  top 
percentile in the distribution of health expenditure as a share of per capita consumption 
expenditure.    
 
Table  1  suggests  that  for  almost  all  possible  socio-economic  covariates,  insured 
households  tended  to  utilize  public  health  services  more  than  uninsured  households. 
Similarly,  Figure  3  and  Figure  4  clearly  depict  profile  of  health  related  expenditure 
paraded from the poorest to the richest both for insured and uninsured households. The 
result is very suggestive of significant income shock protection. The drop-lines are more 
pronounced  for  uninsured  than  insured  households.  One  could  visualize  an  algebraic 
expression of Figures 3 and 4 as defining a weighted index of some sort of health related 
vulnerability,  where  xi  stands  for  total  consumption  expenditure,  hi  is  household 















For the model based estimations, we used the following control variables: Age of the 
head of the household, household size, sex of the head of the household, marital status, 
log consumption in adult equivalent, main sector of activity, level of schooling, dummies 
for 30 districts, dummies for illness and disability conditions, dummies for land right 
certifications, etc..  
                                                 
iv  Figures (3) and (4) are due to Francios Diop, World Bank. We used a variation of this definition to 
construct a variable to capture income protection induced by insurance schemes.    14 
4.  Discussion of results 
 
The  results  based  on  simple  probit  model  are  summarized  in  Table  (4)  where  the 
marginal  effects  for alternative sub-groupings are reported. The  findings suggest  that 
membership into CBHISs had a potential of increasing health care utilization by about 
15% following an illness episode. The effect is slightly higher for poor households than 
the non-poor. With regard to catastrophic expenditure, there is significant effect returned 
by  the  probit  model  where  insured  households  had  a  much  lower  probability  of 
experiencing catastrophic expenditure compared to the uninsured and more so among the 
poor than the non-poor. It is also important to be careful about the robustness of the 
simple probit model to several unobserved factors despite the weak exogenity assumption 
provided by the test. Perhaps under the circumstances the matching estimator could be 
able to isolate the effects of observed covariates much more effectively than the simple 
probit  specification  and  it  has  also  the  added  advantage  that  the  estimator  does  not 
assume any functional form on the error terms (see for example, Barros and Machado, 
2008).  
 
The results from the matching estimator generally provide a much rosy picture of the 
effect of CBHISs on the variables of interest. Table (5) reports the average treatment 
effect  over  all  samples  of  membership  to  CBHISs  on  health  service  utilization  and 
income protection for all households and subset of poor and non-poor households. The 
results indicate that households that were members of the CBHISs had a 15 percentage 
point higher utilization of health care facilities than uninsured ones following an illness 
episode. In this regard, the degree of utilization is much higher among the non-poor than 
the poor, which also in the Rwandan setting makes a lot more sense since the non-poor 
literally pay much less for the insurance premium than the non-poor and also tended to 
have higher subscription rates to the program.  
 
The  matching  estimator  provides  also  an  opportunity  to  compare  the  effect  of 
membership to the CBHISs among the insured commonly referred to as the Average 
Treatment  Effect  of the Treated  (ATT) and among the uninsured known as Average   15 
Treatment Effect of the Control group (ATC). The ATT provides what the impact of 
membership on the outcome variables has been without resort to the control group. It 
measures the extent to which insured households for instance utilized health care services 
in their own right. The result reported in Table 6 suggests that utilization of modern 
health care services  among the insured did not have statistically significant effect on 
health utilization, particularly among the poor. The non-poor did show 21 percentage 
point increase in  the use of health services.  In other words,  the arrival of the health 
insurance scheme certainly has increased health service utilization significantly among 
the non-poor. The CBHISs succeeded however in reducing significantly health related 
consumption shocks in all households, more among the poor than the non-poor. This 
result is very encouraging since health related shocks have the potential of persisting for a 
long time in typical poor households.  
 
ATC measures the potential effect of the CBHISs by matching households only in the 
sample who were not insured. The estimator recovers the average effect of membership 
to CBHISs from a random sample of uninsured households. The result as reported in 
Table  7  suggests  that  if  the  insurance  scheme  was  extended  to  non-members,  heath 
utilization would increase by 18 percentage points. This figure is close to 30 percentage 
points for non-poor households and about 10 percentage points among poor households. 
With respect to income protection, the potential of CBHIs is still very high. It could 
reduce catastrophic expenditure by 17 percentage points and much more significantly 
among the poor than the non-poor households. Overall the matching estimator indicates 
stronger evidence of better utilization of health care facilities and income protection due 




Rwanda is one of the few countries in Africa that has taken CBHISs to a great length. 
Health insurance coverage increased dramatically in recent years where CBHISs service 
to 85% of the population amidst lingering concerns on whether they are effective and 
equitable instruments for the delivery of basic health care services. Rwanda’s experience   16 
is also attracting attentions beyond its borders where governments burdened by rising 
health  care  costs  are  looking  towards  such  innovative  schemes.  This  study  is  a  first 
attempt to formally analyze whether or not CBHISs attained its intended objectives using 
traditional  regression  approach  and  matching  estimator  popular  in  the  evaluation 
literature, each with its own comparative advantage.  
 
Since the data on which the analysis is based comes from field survey, it is difficult to 
isolate spurious relationships from causal effects due to unobserved factors, measurement 
error as well as omitted variables. Some attempt was made to examine the extent to 
which membership to CBHISs could be weakly exogenous under certain assumptions 
which was supported by the appropriate test. One still wonders if instrumental variable 
methods would not be indicated in any case. The result from the simple probit model 
suggested that the effect of membership to CBHISs has led to high degree of utilization 
of health services and helped protect members from large and unforeseen catastrophic 
health related expenses. The results are extremely favorable to poor households than non-
poor households. Similar study  undertaken on  Senegal  using the regression approach 
more or less reached at the same conclusion (Jutting, 2003). 
 
The matching estimator, which does not rely on any functional form, has better predictive 
powers under the assumption that unobserved factors would not simultaneously influence 
the outcome and treatment variables (e.g.   Barros and Machado, 2008, Johar, 2007)
v. The 
result form these estimators are all consistent with the simple probit model in terms of 
validating the CBHISs as potent instrument for health service delivery and protection of 
households form consumption risk. As a scheme, the CBHISs helped the non -poor more 
in terms of higher utilization of health services and the poor in terms of protecting th em 
from unforeseen health related expenses. This result has to be seen however with caution 
noting the underlying assumptions of each method. Often, matching estimators have been 
credited  for  robustness  more  than  they  actually  deserve  and  rarely  are  capabl e  of 
                                                 
v Wooldridge (2009) showed that using instruments in matching estimators does more harm than good by 
introducing biases in the estimator.    17 
explaining why a program is working (Deaton, 2009)
vi. Given the specific conditions 
prevailing in Rwanda, it is not surprising to observe that households that were enrolled in 
CBHISs indeed reaped the benefits since the alternative is evidently worse.  A sticking 
point in the whole debate is the flat premium that inherently discriminates against the 
poor. As the results indicated, the poor also tended to have low utilization rate of the 
health services reinforcing the inequity imbedded in the system. Fix ing this may not be 
easy, but could have the potential of crowding out the poor from the health services 
market.  
   
                                                 
vi See also Heckman and Urzua (2009) and Imbens (2009) for an interesting debate on the topic.    18 
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Table.1 
Curative Health Care Seeking Behavior  
Entry in the Modern Health Care System among Beneficiaries and Non-Beneficiaries of Mutuelles 
Schemes  
By Socio-Economic Characteristics: EICV2 2005/2006 
 
Household or Individual 
Characteristics 
Proportion (%) of sick individuals who sought care at a modern 
health care provider 
 
Beneficiaries  Non-beneficiaries 
Proportion (%)  Proportion (%) 
































































































Secondary school incomplete 
Secondary complete 
University and above 

















Distance from nearest modern facility 




> 10 km 
Total 
   21 
Table  .2:  Probit regression of determinant of household participation in Mututelles (marginal 
effects) 
Dependent variable is a dummy where household head is a member of Mutuelles  
  coef  p-values in bracket 
Sex of the head is male  0.055***  [0.00471] 
Household size (<3 is base)     
3-4  0.081***  [0.00671] 
5-7  0.106***  [0.000509] 
>8  0.212***  [0.00640] 
Age of head of household (<25 is base)     
25-34  0.071**  [0.0402] 
35-49  0.073**  [0.0364] 
>50  0.076**  [0.0376] 
Level of education of head (base:illiterate)     
Primary incomplete  0.039**  [0.0451] 
Primary complete  0.108***  [7.35e-06] 
Vocational  0.153***  [0.000654] 
Secondary school incomplete  0.142**  [0.0121] 
Secondary complete  -0.081  [0.331] 
University or above  -0.067  [0.686] 
Consumption quintile (base:poorest)     
quintile2  0.016  [0.493] 
quintile3  0.115***  [1.48e-06] 
quintile4  0.113***  [9.31e-06] 
Richest  0.125***  [0.000159] 
Sector of activity of head (base: agriculture)     
Industry  0.001  [0.958] 
Services  0.003  [0.905] 
Distance to nearest health center (<1 km is base)     
1-4  0.041  [0.240] 
4-7  0.021  [0.516] 
7-10  0.018  [0.683] 
>10  0.027  [0.478] 
Geographic dummies Nyarugenge is base)     
Gasabo  0.08  [0.382] 
Kicukiro  0.011  [0.866] 
Nyanza  -0.049  [0.446] 
Gisagara  0.021  [0.753] 
Nyaruguru  -0.037  [0.549] 
Huye  0.021  [0.770] 
Nyamagabe  0.119*  [0.0905] 
Ruhango  0.06  [0.401] 
Muhanga  0.125*  [0.0651] 
Kamonyi   0.255***  [0.000109] 
Karongi  0.182**  [0.0131] 
Rutsiro  0.221***  [0.00117] 
Rubavu  0.175***  [0.00751] 
Nyabihu  0.056  [0.410] 
Ngororero  0.123*  [0.0533] 
Rusizi  0.257***  [6.32e-05] 
Nyamasheke  0.224***  [0.00106] 
Rulindo  0.07  [0.328] 
Gakenke  0.143**  [0.0372] 
Musanze  0.121*  [0.0760] 
Burera  0.086  [0.247] 
Gicumbi  0.123*  [0.0526] 
Rwamagana  0.175***  [0.00702] 
Nyagatare  0.025  [0.722] 
Gatsibo  -0.074  [0.280] 
Kayonza  0.141**  [0.0383] 
Kirehe  0.088  [0.215] 
Pseudo-R2  0.0655     22 
Observations  4175   
 




Table 3: Determinants of entry into modern health-care system (marginal effects after probit) 
Dummy if household is insured  0.159927***  [2.58e-05] 
Age  -0.00866  [0.425] 
AGE2  0.000079  [0.535] 
Household size  -0.00271  [0.775] 
Dummy for Urban residence  -0.160843***  [0.00206] 
SEX==Male  0.040933  [0.312] 
Log of pecapita consumption   0.088167***  [0.000526] 
Primary incomplete  0.063177  [0.139] 
Primary complete  0.014136  [0.793] 
Vocational  0.015687  [0.870] 
Secondary school incomplete  0.022743  [0.832] 
Secondary complete  0.455521*  [0.0734] 
District dummies (Nyarugenge is base)     
Gasabo  0.007279  [0.968] 
Kicukiro  0.021318  [0.930] 
Nyanza  -0.02536  [0.892] 
Gisagara  0.042278  [0.825] 
Nyaruguru  0.169507  [0.412] 
Huye  0.283806  [0.141] 
Nyamagabe  -0.00288  [0.986] 
Ruhango  0.00264  [0.988] 
Muhanga  0.049183  [0.797] 
Kamonyi  0.070524  [0.739] 
Karongi  0.080518  [0.687] 
Rutsiro  0.000796  [0.997] 
Rubavu  0.087038  [0.658] 
Nyabihu  0.472798**  [0.0326] 
Ngororero  -0.17556  [0.134] 
Rusizi  -0.03787  [0.823] 
Nyamasheke  0.003997  [0.982] 
Rulindo  0.225909  [0.303] 
Gakenke  0.316679  [0.150] 
Musanze  0.122391  [0.549] 
Burera  0.239884  [0.306] 
Gicumbi  -0.01092  [0.949] 
Rwamagana  0.166379  [0.432] 
Nyagatare  0.020054  [0.912] 
Gatsibo  -0.07617  [0.620] 
Kayonza  -0.09588  [0.516] 
Kirehe  -0.08902  [0.561] 
Ngoma  0.06514  [0.724] 
Bugesera  -0.01371  [0.940] 
Dummy if household head is seriously ill  0.021156  [0.530] 
Dummy if household head is disabled  0.036345  [0.666]   23 
Household head has land certificate   0.037284  [0.319] 
Pseudo R2  0.113   
     
Observations  783   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
+University and above dropped due to collinearity.  
 
 
Table 4: Marginal effects of membership to CBIs on selected variables: simple probit 




Utilization of modern health care (households that reported 
sick) 
.1599***  [0.000]  0.3828 
Utilization of modern health care among the insured poor   .1714***  [0.001]  0.7052 
Utilization of modern health care among the insured non-
poor 
.16756**  [0.006]  0.458 
Out of pocket catastrophic health expenditure (all 
households) 
-0.028***  [0.000]  0.993 
Out of pocket catastrophic health expenditure (all 
households with positive health expenditure) 
-.2923***  [0.000]  0.9127 
Out of pocket catastrophic health expenditure (poor 
households with positive health expenditure) 
-.3226***  [0.000]  0.795 
Out of pocket catastrophic health expenditure (non-poor 
households with positive health expenditure) 
-.2632***  [0.000]  0.3358 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 5: Average treatment effect of community health insurance in Rwanda using simple matching 
estimator(ATE) 
  Coefficient  p-value  Number of 
observations 
Utilization of modern health care (households that 
reported sick) 
0.146**  0.000  786 
Utilization of modern health care (households that were 
poor and reported sick) 
.085**  .046  397 
Utilization of modern health care (households that were 
non-poor and reported sick) 
0.269***  0.000  390 
Out of pocket catastrophic health expenditure (all 
households with positive health expenditure) 
-0.164***  .001  273 
Out of pocket catastrophic health expenditure (poor 
households with positive health expenditure) 
-.228**  .010  101 
Out of pocket catastrophic health expenditure (non-poor 
households with positive health expenditure) 
-.239**  0.001  101 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 6: Average treatment effect of community health insurance in Rwanda among the treated using 
simple matching estimator (ATT) 




Utilization of modern health care (households that reported 
sick) 
0.060  0.107  786 
Utilization of modern health care (households that were poor 
and reported sick) 
.052  0.282  397 
Utilization of modern health care (households that were non- 0.207***  .000  390   24 
poor and reported sick) 
Out of pocket catastrophic health expenditure (all households 
with positive health expenditure) 
-.151***  .009  273 
Out of pocket catastrophic health expenditure (poor 
households with positive health expenditure) 
-.255***  .000  101 
Out of pocket catastrophic health expenditure (non-poor 
households with positive health expenditure) 
-.19760**  0.004  101 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 7: Average treatment effect of community health insurance in Rwanda among the 
control group  using simple matching estimator 




Utilization of modern health care (households that reported 
sick) 
0.183***  .000  786 
Utilization of modern health care (households that were 
poor and reported sick) 
.098**  .036  397 
Utilization of modern health care (households that were 
non-poor and reported sick) 
0.298***  0.000  390 
Out of pocket catastrophic health expenditure (all 
households with positive health expenditure) 
-0.173**  .001  273 
Out of pocket catastrophic health expenditure (poor 
households with positive health expenditure) 
-0.228**  0.010  101 
Out of pocket catastrophic health expenditure (non-
poor households with positive health expenditure) 
-.22519**  0.002  101 
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Figure 1: Per capita expenditure on health and education as a share of per capita consumption expenditure 
in Africa 
 
Source: ADB International Comparison Project (2005) 
 
Figure2: Per capita expenditure on health as a share of per capita consumption expenditure in Africa 
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Figure 3: normalized out-of-pocket expenditure as a difference of total expenditure for 
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Figure 4: Out-of-pocket expenditure as a difference of total expenditure for households 
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